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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This appeal arises from a lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Tracy Sales against
former Defendant Linda Cook 1 and Defendant Stacie Peabody d/b/a Fingerprints Day Spa
("Ms. Peabody"). Plaintiff alleged that Defendants "were negligent in causing injury and
damage to Plaintiff as a result of the performance of the pedicure" Plaintiff received at
Fingerprints Day Spa. (R. p. 8). Plaintiff also alleged that Ms. Peabody was vicariously
liable for the actions of Defendant Cook. The district court granted Ms. Peabody's motion
for summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim, finding that Plaintiff had "provided no
set offacts under which Cook could possibly have been Defendants' agent or employee."2
(R. p.1 04). The district court granted Ms. Peabody's second motion for summary judgment
on the remainder of Plaintiff's claims, finding that "[t]he evidence submitted by the Plaintiff
in this case on the element of causation is not significantly probative." (R. p. 326). Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration of that decision, which the district court denied. Plaintiff has
appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on Ms. Peabody's second
motion for summary judgment. 3
2.

Statement of Facts.

At the time of the incident underlying the lawsuit, on or around April 19, 2010,
Ms. Cook was a licensed cosmetologist and had been leasing space from Ms. Peabody

1 The other parties stipulated to dismiss Ms. Cook, and an Order of Dismissal on Defendant
Linda Cook was entered by the district court. (R. p. 352).
2

Plaintiff has not appealed that decision.

3 As discussed below, Plaintiff seemingly has failed to appeal the district court's denial of her
Motion to Reconsider.
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at Fingerprints Day Spa for almost three years. (R. p. 23 ~1; R. p. 47 9:8-19; R. p. 273 ~
2). Under the lease arrangement between Ms. Cook and Ms Peabody, Ms. Cook was
obligated to bring and use her own supplies, including nail implements. (R. p. 29 ~ 3); R.
p. 23

~

3)). Ms. Cook shared the use of two foot basins with other lessees, but cleaned

the foot basin that she used. (R. p. 273

~

6).

Idaho Code requires that instruments used by licensed cosmetologists such
as Ms. Cook be cleaned and disinfected prior to use on each patron. Idaho Code § 54824A. Fingerprints Day Spa was inspected by the Bureau of Occupational Licensing, and
always received an "A" rating. (R. p. 215-20). Ms. Peabody cleaned and sanitized her own
tools and implements, including the foot basin, before and after providing pedicure services
to each of her clients. (R. p. 52-5329:6 to 30:21). However, Ms. Peabody did not provide
any services to Plaintiff at any time, including the date in question, April 19, 2010. (R. p.
29). Ms. Peabody has repeatedly contested that she had any duty to clean the foot basins
for her lessees, and no such duty has been established. (E.g. R. p. 118-20).
Ms. Cook provided the pedicure services at issue to Plaintiff. (R. p. 8). Ms.
Cook had complete and full control over every aspect of her business, including her own
sanitation procedures. (R. p. 29 ~ 3; R. p. 23 ~ 3).

Ms. Cook and the other technicians'

operations were inspected by the Bureau of Occupational Licensing, and always received
"A" ratings. (R. p. 235 30: 17-21). Ms. Cook has testified that she cleaned the foot basin
she used with her pedicure clients. (R. p. 273 ~ 6).
Plaintiff testified that during the pedicure performed by Ms. Cook, "[w]hen
going around the cuticle it was sensitive in one area .... [O]n my right toe. Right at the nail
bed .... Well, after there was a little bit of redness. But never any blood .... The next day
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -3

it was sensitive, and red, and puffing up." (R. p. 185-8684:3 to 85:10). Plaintiff further
testified that "within a short period of time [the pain] dissipated and wasn't red and puffy
anymore." (R. p. 18685:15-16). Then, "[s]ometime during the summer" the pain returned
"in a totally different aspect." (R. p. 18685:25 to 86:2). At that time, Plaintiff "used to run
and work out at home" and "assumed it was [her] shoes." (R. p. 18686:9-10). She recalled
her toe being "painful" in September, approximately five months after the pedicure, and by
October it was "extremely painful and had been swollen about three times the size of [her]
normal toe." (R. p. 18686:15-17).
The first time Plaintiff presented to any medical provider with complaints
regarding her toe was October 11, 2010, almost six months after the pedicure procedure
performed by Ms. Cook. (R. p. 158-59; R. p. 18687:17-22). At that time, she reported
noticing thickening and separation of the nail from the foot "[f]or the past 16 months," i.e.
since almost a year before the pedicure procedure. (R. p. 158). She also reported that she
"did injure the toes and dropped a book on them sometime ago." Id. Plaintiff subsequently
treated with numerous medical providers, who variously diagnosed her medical condition
as psoriatic arthritis, onychomycosis, cellulitis, osteomyelitis, paronychia, and psoriatic
"sausage digit". (R. p. 160; R. p. 149-151; R. p. 154-55; R. p.152-153; R. p.156-57; R. p.
162-63).
Plaintiff eventually presented to podiatrist Jeffrey L. Chandler on December
27, 2010. (R. p. 267). At that time, Dr. Chandler "thought [Plaintiff] may have had an
ingrown toe nail stemming from the April 2010 pedicure," and decided to perform an
excision on the toe. Id. At a January 3,2011 follow-up visit it was noted that "redness and
swelling had decreased." Id. During a subsequent visit on January 17, 2011, the joint still
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -4

appeared to be inflamed, and Dr. Chandler chose to open the joint, clean it out and
perform a culture. (R. p. 268), The culture "appeared to be clean." Id. During a follow-up
on January 20, "the edema seemed to be subsiding." Id.

Plaintiff returned to Dr.

Chandler'S office on February 28 "with concerns that her toe was still swollen and red." Id.
Dr. Chandler noted that it "appeared she was still having an arthritic process," but "decided
to look for mycobacteria." Id. On March 14 a biopsy was performed; the results were

negative.ld.
Plaintiff filed suit naming Defendants Cook and Stacie Peabody d/b/a
Fingerprints Day Spa on April 10,2012. (R. p. 2). Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint:

VII. . . . During the pedicure Plaintiffs right big toe was
punctured or otherwise injured by an instrument or instruments
being used to perform the pedicure. Defendant Linda Cook
performed the pedicure on the date of the incident at
Defendant Peabody's facility.
VIII. Later, the cuticle and skin around the toe nail became red
and swollen. Infection set in and Plaintiffs condition worsened,
resulting in significant injury to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff required
numerous treatments and procedures, including surgery.

(R. p. 8). Plaintiff then enumerated two causes of action: "Negligence" and "Respondeat
Superior." Count I, the "Negligence" claim, alleged negligence on the part of "Defendants"
in failing "to avoid injury or infection to Plaintiff and others for whom they performed
pedicure procedures." (R. p. 8). Neither Ms. Peabody nor her d/b/a are mentioned by
name in Count I.
More than a year after the Complaint was filed, subsequent to conducting
written discovery and the taking of depositions, Ms. Peabody moved for summary judgment
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on April 25, 2013.

In opposition to Ms. Peabody's motion, Plaintiff argued that Ms.

Peabody had not properly moved for summary judgment on the "Negligence" claim, yet
submitted various documents attached to the Affidavit of James F. Jacobson, including the
Expert Witness Report of Doug Schoon (hereinafter "Schoon Report") and a report by
Jeffrey L. Chandler, D.P.M. (hereinafter "Chandler Report") (R. p. 61-64; R. p. 72-76).
Plaintiff later submitted the Affidavit of Jeffrey L. Chandler, D.P.M. "in support of Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendants Stacie Peabody and Fingerprints Day Spa's Motion for Summary
Judgment" (hereinafter "First Chandler Affidavit") attaching the same Chandler Report
previously filed with the Jacobson affidavit. (R. p. 92-99).
In Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition, she argued that she had satisfied
the elements of her direct negligence claim against Ms. Peabody. Ms. Peabody responded
to those arguments in her Reply Memorandum, in part, as follows:
Plaintiff cannot possibly establish proximate cause. Plaintiff
alleges that "[d]uring the pedicure procedure Plaintiffs right toe
was punctured or otherwise injured by an instrument or
instruments being used to perform the pedicure. Defendant
Cook performed the pedicure .... " In other words, Plaintiff
alleges that the injury, if any, resulted from Ms. Cook's actions.
Thus, even if Ms. Peabody had any responsibility for cleaning
the foot basins for the lessees (which Ms. Peabody denies),
there is no evidence in the record that she failed to do so, or
that failing to do so caused any injury to Plaintiff. There is not
even evidence that the foot basin was unclean! Beyond pure
speculation, it is difficult to conceive how any link between Ms.
Peabody's actions (or inactions) and Plaintiff's alleged injuries
could be established. To date, Plaintiff certainly has failed to
put forth any evidence of such a link. This failure js
determinative and fatal to Plaintiff's action.
(R. p. 88-89). The court heard oral argument on Ms. Peabody's motion, and ultimately
granted Ms. Peabody's motion with regard to the respondeat superior claim. (R. p. 100).
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Ms. Peabody then filed her second motion for summary judgment with
respect to Plaintiffs Count I, the "Negligence" claim. Ms. Peabody also moved the district
court to strike the Schoon Report. (R. p. 109; R. p. 113). In her supporting memorandum,
Ms. Peabody pointed out that Plaintiff had not established that Ms. Peabody owed any duty
to Plaintiff under the particular circumstances, and once again, that Plaintiff could not
possibly establish proximate cause. (R. p. 118-20; R. p. 124). In her argument, Ms.
Peabody attacked the deficiencies in the previously filed Schoon Report, and noted that
Plaintiffs submissions, considered together, failed to establish a causal link between Ms.
Peabody's actions and Plaintiffs alleged injuries. (R. p. 117-22; R. p. 124).4 Plaintiff
responded by filing a memorandum opposing Ms. Peabody's motion, appending the very
same Chandler Report and Schoon Report that Plaintiff had filed in opposition to the first
motion for summary judgment.
At oral argument on Ms. Peabody's second motion for summary judgment,
the district court noted that "[t]he most important point is that even if the foot basin was
filthy and had all kinds of bacteria in it, the plaintiff still failed to allege causation." (Tr. p.
55 LL. 17-20). Defense counsel agreed, stating that "Dr. Chandler's so-called causation
opinion can't reasonably be interpreted to extend to the foot basin itself.... the Court
would have to interpret his opinion that plaintiffs condition is related to the incident to
mean: Plaintiffs condition is related to the foot basin. But Dr. Chandler has no idea what
the condition of the foot basin was. Therefore, there is absolutely no way that he could
make that causal connection." (Tr. p. 56 LL. 2-16). Plaintiffs counsel requested additional
4 Ms. Peabody also argued "there is no basis for Plaintiffs 'duty to warn' claim, and the same
should be dismissed." (R. p. 122). Plaintiff has made no response, in briefing or at oral argument, to that
argument.
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time to provide further briefing on the issue of causation, and the court gave both parties
until July 19, 2013 to do so. (Tr. p. 69 LL. 2-21; R. p. 321). Plaintiff's counsel subsequently
requested three additional days to respond to Ms. Peabody's supplemental briefing, which
request also was granted. (R. p. 321).
The court determined that: (1) Dr. Chandler's opinions amounted to
"[c]onjecture, speculation, or a working hypothesis," and (2) "[a] dirty foot basin could only
have been the 'condition or occasion upon which injuries were received.'" (R. p. 325; R. p.
27). Accordingly, the district court granted Ms. Peabody's summary judgment on two
alternate bases: (1) that Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged breach of duty by Ms. Peabody
caused any injury to Plaintiff, and (2) that even if Plaintiff had provided evidence that a dirty
foot basin contributed to Plaintiff's injury, the actions of Linda Cook constituted a
superseding event.
Plaintiff filed her Motion to Reconsider and supporting memorandum on
August 7, 2013, along with a second affidavit of Dr. Chandler (hereinafter "Second
Chandler Affidavit"). Plaintiff did not request oral argument on her motion. (R. p. 334). In
Plaintiff's memorandum she argued for the first time that the opinions of Dr. Chandler, and
her claim against Ms. Peabody, contemplated a theory of causation that excluded the
"puncture" inflicted by Ms. Cook during the pedicure and, rather, related only to the
condition of the foot basin. In her response, Ms. Peabody pointed out that Dr. Chandler's
new and/or revised opinions regarding the condition of the foot basin were not based on
personal knowledge. (R. p. 356-57).

Ms. Peabody also questioned Plaintiff's new

interpretation of her pleadings, and discussed the Cramer v. Slater factors regarding
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -8

superseding cause as they applied to the facts of Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff chose not to file
any reply memorandum.
On September 3,2013, the district court issued its Order Denying Plaintiffs
Motion to Reconsider Prior Order Granting Summary Judgment on Count I. The court
based its ruling on the fact that Plaintiffs new interpretation of her pleadings, supported by
the Second Chandler Affidavit, raised a new theory of negligence that was directly
contradicted by the plain language of her pleadings. (R. p. 366-67). The court found it
would be improper to grant Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration based on the new theory
"raised for the first time in an affidavit in support of a motion to reconsider." Id. Final
Judgment was entered by the court on September 19, 2013, and Plaintiff noticed the
present appeal on September 24, 2013.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Plaintiff is estopped or otherwise prohibited from asserting

a new theory of negligence for the first time on a motion for reconsideration.
2.

Whether Plaintiff has established that Ms. Peabody, as a lessor, owed

any duty to maintain equipment used by her lessee for the lessee's business.
3.

Whether the Chandler materials are inadmissible as evidence in

opposition to Ms. Peabody's motion for summary judgment.
4.

Respondent requests her reasonable costs and attorney fees on

appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code § 12-121.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a district court's decision to grant summary judgment, the Idaho
Supreme Court employs the same standard of review as did the district court in ruling on
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -9

the motion. Brown v. City of Pocatel/o , 1481daho 802, 806, 229 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010).
Summary judgment may be entered when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."
I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Kelso v. Lance, 134 Idaho 373, 375, 3 P.3d 51, 53 (2000). The
moving party has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact. BMC

West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890,893,174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007). The non-moving
party may not rely on mere speculation to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Hollinsworth, M.D., 136 Idaho 800,802,41 P.3d 228, 230 (2001). Rather,
the non-moving party must put forth admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could rely. Bromleyv. Garey, 1321daho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999). On review, the Court
"liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Turpen v. Granieri, 133
Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999). However, "the inferences must be drawn from
evidence." R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 142 Idaho 87, 93, 123 P.3d 720, 726 (Idaho App.
2005). Further, "a mere scintilla of evidence or slight doubt as to facts is not sufficient to
create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." Samuel v. Hepworth,

Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000); see also
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,64 P.3d 317 (2003). "The decision to grant or deny
a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court."

Carnell v. Baker Mgmt. Co., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 651, 658 (2002) (quoting
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001)) ..
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ARGUMENT
The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of claims that are
unsupported by the evidence. When the movant shows that the plaintiff lacks evidence
to support an element of her claim, the plaintiff must present admissible evidence to
support the challenged element. If the plaintiff fails to do so, summary judgment should
be entered in the moving party's favor. Here, the district court found that Plaintiff had failed
to put forth competent evidence of causation, and that Ms. Peabody's actions could not be
considered a proximate cause of Plaintiff's alleged injury. Therefore, the district court
considered the evidence presented and properly granted Ms. Peabody's motion for
summary judgment, which should not be disturbed on appeal.
The court also properly denied Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, which was
based on an unpleaded issue raised for the first time after summary judgment. Plaintiff
cites Idaho's notice pleading requirement as justification for her prejudicial attempt to
present a new theory of her case after summary judgment was entered. The issue on
appeal requires the Court to consider whether a plaintiff is permitted to change her position
only at the last minute for the sole purpose of avoiding summary judgment.
On reconsideration of its summary judgment decision, the district court found
it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the Chandler materials satisfy the
requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). However, because the question of
whether an affidavit satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(e) is one of law, this Court may
decide that issue de novo. Ms. Peabody respectfully submits that the district court's Order
may be affirmed on the basis that the Chandler materials do not constitute admissible
evidence sufficient to oppose summary judgment.
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Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Ms. Peabody owed Plaintiff
any duty under the particular circumstances of this case. That is, the Schoon Report
improperly opines on questions of law, and there is no statutory or common law duty
requiring a lessor to maintain equipment used by her lessee for the lessee's own business
purposes. Accordingly, the district court's decision should be affirmed on these alternative
grounds.
1.

The District Court Acted Appropriately in Granting Ms. Peabody's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying the Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration.

Plaintiff was provided numerous opportunities to present evidence in support
of her claims, but presented the district court with only inadequate, insufficient and
inadmissible evidence on the element of causation. In addition, based on the evidence in
the record, and construing in Plaintiff's favor all inferences that may reasonably be drawn
therefrom, proximate cause could not possibly be attributed to the actions of Ms. Peabody.
Therefore, the district court acted appropriately in dismissing Plaintiff's claims on summary
judgment.

Also, the court appropriately denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration,

because Plaintiff did not remedy the evidentiary deficiencies in the materials she previously
had presented, and attempted to present the court with evidence of a cause of action not
raised in her pleadings, and which constituted a reversal of her prior position.
a.

The district court correctly found that the Chandler
submissions do not create a genuine issue of material fact with
regard to any negligence claim against Ms. Peabody.

"Evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must be admissible." Bromley v. Gary, 132 Idaho 807,811,979 P.2d 1165,
1169 (1999). For an affidavit to be admissible in opposition to summary judgment, the
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require, in part, that the "opposing affidavit must be made
on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that
the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Id. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e). "The
requirements of Rule 56(e) are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conslusory, based on
hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge." State of Idaho v. Shama Resources

Ltd., 127 Idaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995).
Long prior to filing her second motion for summary judgment, Ms. Peabody
repeatedly pointed out that Dr. Chandler had provided no basis for relating Plaintiff's
alleged injury to the condition of the foot basin. (R. p. 89; Tr. p. 20 LL. 2-25 to p. 21 LL.
1-13; Tr. p. 40 LL. 23-25 to p. 41 LL. 1-23).5

That deficiency rendered the Chandler

materials inadmissible to oppose summary judgment, per the above-cited authority.
Plaintiff made no attempt to correct the problems with the Chandler materials, but instead
submitted the same report and affidavit in response to Ms. Peabody's second motion for
summary judgment.

Therefore, Ms. Peabody replied that the materials still were

inadequate and inadmissible because they were conclusory and not made on personal
knowledge. (R. p. 302-303).

The district court agreed, and found that the materials

submitted by Plaintiff's expert Dr. Chandler amounted to "conjecture," and pointed out that
"[c]onjecture, speculation, or a working hypothesis is not enough to withstand summary
judgment." (R. p. 325).

5 Plaintiff's assertion that U[t]he issue of the claimed inadequacy of wording of Dr. Chandler's
causation opinions was brought up sua sponte by the Court" is inaccurate. Appellant's Brief p.9 (Jan. 21,
2014).
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Only upon moving for reconsideration did Plaintiff make any attempt to
correct the inadequacy of the Chandler materials. However, the Second Chandler Affidavit
did not correct the essential flaw the district court found with the doctor's original opinions,
i.e. that they are merely conjecture. Among other things, although he purported, without
explanation, to have determined Plaintiff suffered a mycobacterial infection, it remained a
matter of rank conjecture for him to relate Plaintiff's medical condition to the
cleanliness/sanitation of the foot basin.
There was no evidence in the record that Dr. Chandler ever acquired
personal knowledge regarding the condition of the foot basin.

The only testing ever

performed was done by the Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, which confirmed the
cleanliness of the salon, including the foot basin. (R. p. 215-20). Therefore, Dr. Chandler's
assumptions directly conflict with the evidence in the record, further demonstrating that his
opinions are not reliable. As the district court had previously pointed out, Plaintiff's
causation argument, without evidence to support it, is just argument, which is not sufficient
to defeat summary judgment. (R. p. 326).
Furthermore, Dr. Chandler did not lay any foundation for the opinions
expressed in his Second Affidavit, other than to testify that he "ruled out two other potential
diagnoses." (R. p. 343).

That is, he provided the court with no basis on which he

purportedly ruled out the other diagnoses, nor for purportedly settling on a diagnosis of
mycobacterial infection--then leaping to his utterly unexplicated and unfounded conclusion
regarding the alleged source of any mycobacteria.

Therefore, his affidavit was not

competent evidence to oppose summary judgment. Accordingly, as discussed further in
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Section 3 below, Plaintiff's submissions in support of the motion for reconsideration did not
provide the court with any justification for reconsidering its original decision.
Plai ntiff has misread the court's Order denying her motion for reconsideration
as stating a concession by the court that she has put forth evidence of causation sufficient
to defeat summary judgment. Whereas, the court found only that the Chandler materials
"arguably" constitute some evidence (if admissible) of causation regarding some
negligence claim, but not the negligence claim originally pled. Yet, Plaintiff now requests
that this Court adopt her misreading of the district court's Order, so that it "becomes law
of the case on remand." Appellant's Brief p.13.
Plaintiff is attempting to convince this Court to pigeonhole the district court
into a position it never took.

Not only is Plaintiff's request improper on its face, it is

substantively wrong. As discussed below (see Section 3), the Chandler materials are not
admissible as evidence on summary judgment, because they do not comply with the Rule
56(e) requirements. Therefore, Ms. Peabody respectfully requests that this Court reject
Plaintiff's request to establish as "law of the case" her misreading of the district court's
Order.
b.

The district court correctly found that the actions of Linda Cook
constitute an intervening, superseding cause of Plaintiff's
injuries, if any.

The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 440 definition of a superseding cause, comment thereon, and guidelines to determine
whether an intervening act is a superseding cause. Cramerv. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,877,
204 P.3d 508, 517 (2009); Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323,328-29,411 P.2d 768,771
(1966). "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its
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inteNention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent
negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." Lundy, 411 P.2d at 771 (quoting
Restatement (Second) Torts § 440 (1965)). If "it is found that a superseding cause has
operated, there is no need of determining whether the actor's antecedent conduct was or
was not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." Id. Although ordinarily a jury
question, the court may determine what constitutes proximate cause when "the proof is so
clear that different minds cannot reasonably draw different conclusions or where all
reasonable minds would construe the facts and circumstances in only one way."Walenta

v. Mark Means Co., 87 Idaho 543, 549, 394 P.2d 329, 332 (1964).
In considering how the Restatement analysis should be applied, the Lundy
Court quoted from an earlier Idaho decision in which the Court identified the "principles to
be drawn from the authorities," concluding that "a subsequent independent act of
negligence" will displace the former as proximate cause unless:
the succeeding act of negligence should be so connected with
the first in time and nature as to make it plain that the damage
was the natural and probable consequence of the original act
or omission, and that to establish this the original negligence
must have been such that it must have been known to, or
anticipated by, the original wrongdoer that, in the natural
course of human conduct, a succeeding act of negligence was
at least likely to be committed ...

Lundy, 411 P.2d at 774 (quoting Scrivnerv. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 46 Idaho 334,
345-46, 628 P. 19, 22 (1928)).

In other words, the key to determining whether a

superseding act operates to displace the actions of a prior actor as proximate cause lies
in determining whether the subsequent act of negligence "was at least likely to be
committed."
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In the Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co. case, supra, the Court
considered whether proximate cause could be attributed to the actions of the defendant
company. The plaintiff's argument was that the allegedly unsafe condition of a gun the
company had provided its watchman constituted a proximate cause of an injury that took
place when the watchman pulled the gun as a joke and accidentally shot the plaintiffs
husband. In applying the above "principles," the Court found that "[n]o two reasonable
minds could differ" that it was not '''extremely probable' or 'likely' or even to be anticipated
'within the range of reasonable foresight''' that the watchman would draw the gun as a joke
and "cause it to be discharged." Scrivner, 46 Idaho at 345,628 P. at 22. Accordingly, the
Court found that as a matter of law the unsafe condition of the gun, if it existed, could not
constitute proximate cause, because the negligent act of the watchman superseded it.
Likewise, in this case, reasonable minds must conclude that it was not
"extremely probably" or "likely" or "within the range of reasonable foresight" that the
negligence of Ms. Cook would occur, i.e., that she would fail to clean the foot basin and/or
her other tools before using them on her client, as required by Idaho Code, and at the
same time, puncture Plaintiffs toe with one of her instruments. The record reflects that at
the time in question Ms. Cook had been leasing space from Ms. Peabody for almost three
years. During that time, Ms. Cook cleaned her own tools and instruments she used with
her clients, including the foot basin. Her cleaning and sanitation procedures were verified
by the Bureau of Occupational Licenses; and, upon inspection by the Bureau, she always
received an "A" rating. In light of that track record, it could not reasonably be said that the
act of negligence by Ms. Cook "was at least likely to be committed." Therefore, per Lundy
and Scrivner, the dirty condition of the foot basin, if it existed, could not, as a matter of
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law, constitute a proximate cause of Plaintiff's alleged injuries, because Ms. Cook's own
negligence superseded it.
Moreover, Ms. Peabody cannot be held liable for "merely furnish[ing] the
condition or occasion" upon which Plaintiff allegedly was injured. Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho
420,426,354 P.2d 172, 175 (1960) (quoting Clark v. Chrishop, 72 Idaho 340,342-43,
241 P.2d 171, 172 (1952)); Chatterton v. Pocatello Post, 70 Idaho 480,484,223 P.2d
389, 391 (1950) (citing 38 Am. Jur. 702). As discussed in detail below, it was and always
has been Plaintiff's contention that Ms. Cook created an "opening for the bacteria" by
puncturing Plaintiff's toe during the pedicure, then exposed the toe to the bacteria by
placing Plaintiff's foot in the allegedly dirty foot basin. Accordingly, even if Ms. Peabody
had failed to clean the foot basin, such failure "merely furnished the condition" upon which
Plaintiff allegedly was injured, and her actions therefore cannot, as a matter of law, be
considered a proximate cause of said injury.
c.

It would have been improper for the district court to have
considered new theories raised for the first time in Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration.

"A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered
on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." Edmondson
v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172,178,75 P.3d 733, 739 (2003). The trial court

may not decide a case on "unpleaded issues" unless those issues have been 'tried by
express or implied consent of the parties.'" M.K. Transp. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,349,
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980) (quoting Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 15(b)).
"'The office of pleading is to inform the court and the parties of the facts in
issue; the court, that it may declare the law, and the parties, that they may know what to
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meet by their proof.'" Ross v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 28 Haw. 404, 416 (1925)

(quoting Hill v. Mendenhall, 88 U.S. 453, 455). Code pleading was abolished in Idaho in
favor of notice pleading so that meritorious claims will not be dismissed simply because the
complaint is "defective, e.g., wrongly captioned or inartful." Brown v. City of Pocatello,
148 Idaho 802,807,229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (quoting Gibson v. Ada Co. Sheriff's
Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003)). However, Idaho's notice pleading statute
never was intended as a means by which a plaintiff could force the opposing party to be
"hypervigilant" in attempting to understand the cause of action being asserted. Brown, 148
Idaho at 810,229 P.3d at 1172. "A plaintiff cannot, in his complaint, paint us a picture of
a four-legged animal with fur and a tail labeled 'cat' and then assert at summary judgment
that the picture depicts a dog." Id. A trial "court is allowed to draw all plain inferences from
the facts plead when determining the question of sufficiency [of a complaint]." Reynolds
v. American Hardware Mut.lns. Co., 115 Idaho 362,364,766 P.2d 1243, 1245 (1988).
"A party opposing a motion for summary judgment simply cannot make a
secret of his evidence until the trial ... A summary judgment motion is intended to 'smoke
out' the facts so that the judge can decide if anything remains to be tried." Walker v.
Hoffman, 583 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Donnellyv. Guion, 467 F.2d 290,
293 (2d Cir. 1972)). Accordingly, "afterthoughts" or "shifting ground" are not an appropriate
bases for reconsideration of summary judgment. Refrigeration Sales Co. v. MitchellJackson, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. III. 1983).
Judicial estoppel, also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent
positions, "precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently
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seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first." McCallister v. Dixon, 154
Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013).

"The policies underlying preclusion of

inconsistent positions are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and
regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings .... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,
252,92 P.3d 492,501 (2004) (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343,
601,94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1996). A party also may be equitably estopped due to the
party's silence. Joplin v. Kitchens, 87 Idaho 530,535,394 P.2d 313,315 (1964).
It has been Plaintiffs contention all along that the negligence of Ms. Cook in
puncturing her toe caused or contributed to the injury alleged. To the extent Plaintiff now
claims otherwise, she did not properly allege causation against Ms. Peabody in her
Complaint. Plaintiff's position is prejudicial because Ms. Peabody was not put on notice
of the details of the direct negligence claim Plaintiff now purports to assert against her.
Therefore, the district court correctly declined to consider Plaintiff's new formulation of any
such claim.
Plaintiff has argued that it was Ms. Peabody's burden to request clarification
of the Complaint by filing a motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(e). Yet, under circumstances
where Plaintiff has perpetuated the confusion, it is Plaintiff's burden to refine her theories
priorto filing a motion for reconsideration, so that Ms. Peabody may prepare her defenses.
Plaintiff should be estopped in her attempt to subvert the intent of Idaho's notice pleading
standard by using it as a sword, rather than a shield.
Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that her toe was "injured" during the
pedicure, "became red and swollen," and "[i]nfection set in." (R. p. 8). No common or
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reasonable interpretation of the word "injured" encompasses "the placement of [Plaintiff]'s
feet in the foot basin," as Plaintiff now would have it. (R. p. 343).

The district court

considered the "plain inferences" of the facts plead, and correctly determined that the
Complaint did not place Ms. Peabody on notice of any theory of negligence not involving
the "puncture" inflicted by Ms. Cook. In fact, as the district court found, Plaintiffs current
position is directly contradicted by the plain language of the Complaint. (R. p. 366). As Ms.
Peabody pointed out previously, Plaintiff's pleadings constitute judicial admissions that she
cannot just "take back" without moving to amend her Complaint. (R. p. 359); Strouse v.

K-Tek, Inc., 1291dah0616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Idaho App. 1997) (citing McLean
v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779,783,430 P.2d 670, 674 (1967).
Through two motions for summary judgment, two oral arguments, and a
motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff framed her theory of negligence in such a way as to
foster an impression by Ms. Peabody-and the district court-that the alleged harm directly
flowed from the "puncture" inflicted by Ms. Cook. For example, in her Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's [First] Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff alleged that
"[d]uring the course of the pedicure, Plaintiff experienced pain in her right toe. This pain
was the result of some puncture of or trauma to Plaintiffs toe, which when exposed to
mycobacteria in the foot basin of the pedicure station, caused severe injury to Plaintiff's toe
that resulted in multiple surgical procedures." Plf.'s Memo. in Opposition to Def.'s

Second Mot. for S.J. pA (July 2, 2013). That language is critical, because it is the only
clear statement in the record concerning Plaintiff's causation theory, and it clearly
demonstrates that Plaintiffs theory contemplated Ms. Cook's actions being integral to the
alleged injury.
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Further, Plaintiff relied upon DeTraz v. Lee, 900 SO.2d 1099 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2005), for the proposition that a "causal presumption" could be applied to establish a link
between a "disability" and a contemporaneously occurring "accident." (R. p. 285). Plaintiff
argued that her own claim against Ms. Peabody "mirrors the De Traz case in many respects
other than the event that created the opening for the bacteria occurred at Defendants'
establishment." (R. p. 285). In other words, Plaintiff argued that an opening for the bacteria
was created, which she alleged was "some puncture of or trauma to Plaintiffs toe." Read
together, Plaintiff's pleadings clearly show that she consistently maintained that it was Ms.
Cook's negligence that caused injury to Plaintiff. It is patently disingenuous for Plaintiff to
now claim that her position all along has been that the alleged injury would have occurred
in the absence of the puncture by Ms. Cook.
The district court, "draw[ing] all plain inferences from the facts plead,"
determined that Plaintiff's pleadings did not sufficiently allege the cause of action she was
attempting to support by her motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the court correctly
concluded that it would have been improper to decide the case on the "unpleaded issue."
In addition, Plaintiff never took advantage of opportunities to correct the
alleged misunderstanding by Ms. Peabody and the district court. Therefore, to the extent
errors were made based on any such misunderstanding, they were invited by Plaintiff and
should not be subject to appeal. 6 See State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836,838,673 P.2d 436,
438 (1983) (recognizing that "I[i]t has long been the law in Idaho that one may not

6 "Invited error" is defined as "[a]n error that a party cannot complain of on appeal because the
party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to make the erroneous ruling." Black's Law
Dictionary 582 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
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successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in, or invited. Errors consented to,
acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.").

In her memorandum in support of the

second motion for summary judgment, Ms. Peabody pointed out that Plaintiff could not
establish causation per the allegations in the Complaint regarding how the injury allegedly
occurred. (R. p. 124). In her response, Plaintiff chose not to provide a clarifying statement
of facts, and instead referred to the "one previously provided to the Court in relation to
Defendants' prior summary judgment motion," i.e., that containing the above statements
regarding the "puncture." (R. p. 277). Therefore, Plaintiff at least "acquiesced in, or invited"
the misunderstanding of which she now complains.

A review of the entire record

demonstrates that Plaintiff appears to have, in fact, deliberately fostered any such
m isu nderstand ing. 7 Accord ing Iy, any error deriving from the misunderstand ing, if there was
one, should not be subject to appeal.
Finally, the federal rule prohibiting a party from introducing new theories or
arguments on a motion for reconsideration is consistent with the rule in Idaho permitting
a party to introduce "new facts" on a motion for reconsideration. Coeur d'Alene Mining

Co. v. First National Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037
(1990). On the other hand, a party opposing summary judgment may not simply hold back
her evidence on summary judgment and present it later after tailoring it to fit the court's
opinion, effectively turning the trial court's decision into a "first draft[] , subject to revision
and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfeo Indus.,

7 It is notable that, whereas Plaintiff repeatedly referred to Ms. Peabody by name in other portions
of the Complaint, Ms. Peabody never is mentioned by name in Plaintiffs Count I; nor is the "foot basin"
ever mentioned.
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Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. III. 1988). Such tactics waste judicial resources and
prejudice the opposing party by forcing the court and the opposing party to meet
arguments that could have been presented in opposition to the summary judgment motion
In this case, having failed to correct any alleged confusion, and in fact having
perpetuated any such confusion, Plaintiff should be estopped from changing her position
and presenting new theories and arguments on a motion for reconsideration. If there was
any misunderstanding regarding Plaintiffs causation theory, Plaintiff elected to sit silently
by as the other parties and the court labored under that misunderstanding. Plaintiff did so
through two motions for summary judgment, although she at least had some duty to clarify
her theory in response to the second motion for summary judgment. Durste/er v.
Durste/er, 108 Idaho 230,233,697 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Idaho App. 1985) (stating that "a

party may be required to refine their pleadings in response to ... motions for summary
judgment."). Ms. Peabody in her reply, and the court in rendering its decision, justifiably
relied on Plaintiffs pleadings and submissions in forming defenses and declaring the
applicable law. Therefore, the elements of equitable and/or judicial estoppel are met, and
the doctrine should be applied to estop Plaintiff from "playing fast and loose with the
courts" by asserting her new causation theory for the first time on her motion for
reconsideration.
2.

The District Court's Decision Should Be Upheld, Because Plaintiff Has
Not Provided Any Competent Evidence to Establish That Ms.
Peabody Owed A Duty to Clean and Sanitize the Equipment Used By
Her Lessees In Performing Pedicures With Their Own Clients.

Plaintiff relied entirely upon her cosmetology expert, Doug Schoon, to provide
evidence that Ms. Peabody owed a duty to Plaintiff. Appellant's Brief p.5. However, his
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opinions are improper, as they are based on his conclusions regarding the application of
law. In fact, his opinions are based on the misapplication of law. There is no basis in law
for imposing upon Ms. Peabody any duty to clean the equipment used by her lessees in
conjunction with their own customers. Plaintiff's failure to establish any duty running from
Ms. Peabody to Plaintiff under the circumstances of this case provides alternative grounds
on which the district court's decision may be affirmed.
a.

Plaintiff's expert Doug Schoon is not qualified to render any
opinion regarding the existence of a duty based on his
interpretation of law. and in any case his opinion is incorrect.
as by its very terms OSHA does not apply under the facts of
this case.

''The existence of a duty is a question of law." Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho
244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999). A witness is "not allowed to give opinions on
questions of law." Carnell v. Barker, 137 Idaho 322, 328,48 P.3d 651,657 (2002).
It was improper for Mr. Schoon, a purported cosmetology expert, to render
an opinion regarding the application of law in Idaho. Yet, Mr. Schoon's sole basis for
opining that as "[a]n owner of a nail establishment, Stacey [sic] Peabody is responsible for
providing safe conditions for workers, clients, visitors, etc. and she is incorrect to place this
responsibility on the inspectors working for the Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses or
the Board of Cosmetology" is his interpretation of OSHA regulations. (R. p. 257). It is
entirely within the purview of the Idaho courts to review the OSHA regulations and
determine whether and how they apply to the facts of this case. Carnell, 137 Idaho at 328,
48 P.3d at 657. Accordingly, Mr. Schoon's opinions regarding whether Ms. Peabody owed
any duty to Plaintiff are improper.
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In addition, even if Mr. Schoon were qualified to render any opinion based
on a duty imposed by law, OSHA does not apply to Ms. Peabody. Therefore, any opinion
by Mr. Schoon based on an assumption that OSHA applies to Ms. Peabody would be
inaccurate. OSHA regulations referred to by Mr. Schoon apply only to employers and
employees, not to independent contractors/lessees.

Given Ms. Cook's status as an

independent contractor/lessee and not as an employee, such regulations are inapplicable.
Accordingly, OSHA regulations have no bearing underthefacts of this case. 8 See 29 CFR,

1910.S(a) (providing that the OSHA standards referred to by Mr. Schoon "apply to
employments performed in a workplace") (emphasis added). Ms. Peabody was not an
employer, and Ms. Cook was not in any sense "employed" by her. As the district court
found, there is "no set offacts under which Cook could possibly have been [Ms. Peabody]'s
agent or employee." (R. p. 104).
b.

There is no basis in Idaho law for imposing a duty upon Ms.
Peabody to clean tools and instruments used by her lessees
for their own business purposes, nor did Ms. Peabody assume
any such duty.

As discussed above, "[t]he existence of a duty is a question of law over which
[the Idaho Supreme Court] exercises free review." Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,
247,985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999). The Court engages in a "balancing of the harm" test"when
"called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or when a duty has

8 Moreover, OSHA was designed to protect "workers." Arrington v. Arrington Bros. Constr.,
Inc. 116 Idaho 887,891,781 P.2d 224,228 (1989). Plaintiff, the allegedly injured party, did not work at
Fingerprints Day Spa. Therefore, the Plaintiff is not a member of the class of persons whom OSHA was
designed to protect, and OSHA does not establish any duty owed by Ms. Peabody to Plaintiff.
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not been previously recognized." Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,846,908 P.2d 143,148
(1995).
Where it is alleged that a duty is owed pursuant to statute, the Court looks
to the statute to determine whether such a statutory duty exists as a matter of law. See
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,908 P.2d 143 (1995); Mugavero v. A-1 Auto Sales, 130
Idaho 554,944 P.2d 151 (Idaho App. 1997). Under the common law, a tenant has a duty
of ordinary care to keep the leased premises under adequate repair. Johnson v. K-mart
Corp., 126 Idaho 316, 882 P.2d 971(ldaho App. 1994). This is a non-delegable duty that
extends to areas that the tenant exclusively controls as well as to areas over which the
tenant and landlord share mutual control. Id. "The common-law duty of a tenant to keep
its premises in a reasonably safe condition for its invitees applies even though the landlord
has covenanted to maintain the premises." Id. at 318, 882 P.2d at 973.
While it is possible to assume a duty where none existed before, liability
arising out of such an assumption of duty can only come into being to the extent that there
is an affirmative undertaking. Udyv. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386,34 P.3d 1069 (2001).
In addition, past volunteer acts do not entitle the benefitted party to expect assistance on
future occasions, at least in the absence of an express promise that future assistance will
be forthcoming. Id. at 389-90, 34 P.3d at 1072-73.
Plaintiff has attempted to read into the applicable Idaho Code and
administrative regulations a duty by Ms. Peabody to ensure the sanitation of the
instruments and equipment used by the independent contractors leasing space in the spa.
Plaintiff specifically points to IDAPA 24.04.01.800(12) to infer that because cosmetology
shops must be "under the direct supervision of a licensed operator," Ms. Peabody owed
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an absolute duty to ensure the sanitation of Ms. Cook's equipment. Appellant's Brief p.
In doing so, Plaintiff ignores other language in both the Idaho Code and the applicable
IDAPA regulations indicating that the sanitation responsibility clearly falls on the
user/operator,

and

depends

upon who

is using the

instrument.

See IDAPA

24.04.01.800.03-.04 ("All instruments used by operators shall be sanitized after cleaning
and prior to use on each patron."); I.C. § 54-824A ("[A]II instruments used by persons
licensed pursuant to this chapter shall, after cleaning and prior to use on each patron, be
disinfected .... "). It is undisputed that Ms. Cook was a licensed cosmetician and was the
equipment operator at the time of Plaintiff's pedicure. Therefore, under I.C. § 54-824A and
IDAPA 24.04.01.800, it was Ms. Cook, not Ms. Peabody, who owed a duty to ensure the
foot basin was cleaned and sanitized before Ms. Cook used it during Plaintiff's pedicure.
In addition, Plaintiff has confused the duties of an employer with those of a
lessor by arguing that Ms. Peabody had a duty to ensure the facility's equipment was
properly disinfected, and that she "abdicated" this purported duty by relying on the Idaho
Bureau of Occupational Licenses to inspect each lessee and provide its inspection results.
Appellant's Brief p. 6. Plaintiff's argument, however, ignores the relationship between the
parties in this case. The district court specifically found no set of facts exist in this case
under which Ms. Cook possibly could have been Ms. Peabody's agent or employee, and
that Ms. Peabody retained no right to control Ms. Cook. (R. p. 104). Plaintiff has not
challenged that finding. In light of Ms. Peabody's inability to control Ms. Cook, it would be
incongruous with the applicable law to impose upon Ms. Peabody a duty to ensure that Ms.
Cook properly cleaned and sanitized equipment prior to using it on her own customers.
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Thus, Ms. Peabody could not "abdicate" any responsibility to the Bureau for
ensuring Ms. Cook's sanitation procedures were appropriate, because Ms. Peabody never
had such responsibility. That is, it always was Ms. Cook's responsibility, as the equipment
operator in control of the premises, to ensure the instruments and equipment she used on
her clients were appropriately sanitized. IDAPA 24.04.01.800.04 ("All instruments used by
operators shall be sanitized after cleaning and prior to use on each patron .... ").
Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument that Ms. Peabody "abdicated" responsibility for ensuring
the foot basins were properly sanitized has absolutely no merit.
There may well be situations in which an employer/spa owner could be found
negligent in not personally seeing to the sanitation of her employee's equipment. But that
situation can occur only where the spa owner has employees, not where the spa owner
contracts with lessees over whom she has no control, and who function as their own,
individual business operators.

A tenant or lessee having control of the premises is

deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to
third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the premises, the general rule is that the
tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair. Johnson v. KMart Corp., 126 Idaho 316,317,882 P.2d 971 (Idaho App. 1994). Therefore, it was Ms.

Cook alone who owed a duty to the Plaintiff to provide a clean and sanitary foot basin
during the subject pedicure.
Furthermore, Ms. Peabody had not assumed a duty to clean the foot basin
on the date of Plaintiff's pedicure, despite Plaintiff's argument that Ms. Peabody hired
someone to clean the work stations at one time. In her brief, Plaintiff points to Ms. Cook's
statement that in 2008, Ms. Peabody increased her lease rates by $10.00/month to hire
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someone to clean the work stations. Appellant's Brief p. 5. However, the fact that Ms.
Peabody may have hired someone to clean the work stations two years prior to the
Plaintiff's pedicure is entirely irrelevant, as it does not establish that Ms. Peabody assumed
the duty to clean the foot basin in preparation for Plaintiffs pedicure on April 19, 2010.
Although a person can assume a duty to act on a particular occasion, the duty is limited
to the discrete episode in which the aid is rendered. See Udy v. Custer Co., supra.
The important fact is that Ms. Peabody did not agree to sanitize the foot
basins for Ms. Cook prior to each and every pedicure that Ms. Cook performed on her own
customers. Therefore, Ms. Cook could not have relied on her to do so, and Ms. Peabody
had no duty to do so. In fact, Ms. Cook testified in her affidavit that she did not rely on Ms.
Peabody to clean the foot basins she used with her own customers, but cleaned them
herself. (R. p. 273116). Thus, Ms. Peabody did not assume any ongoing duty to clean the
foot basin for Ms. Cook, and it remained Ms. Cook's duty to ensure that the equipment was
properly maintained for use with her invitees.
Finally, in the absence of a statutory or assumed duty, the survival of
Plaintiff's claim would require imposing a common law duty where none has previously
existed under Idaho law. As such, a "balancing of the harm" analysis is required to
determine whether Ms. Peabody owed any duty to Plaintiff as an invitee of Ms. Cook. In

Turpen v. Granieri, the Court focused on the balance between "the degree of result or
harm" and "the burden of preventing such injury." 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673

(quoting Sharp v. W.H. Moore Co., 118 Idaho 297,300,796 P.2d 506,509 (1990)). The
Court considered whether it was appropriate to impose upon a lessor responsibility for
activities taking place on the rented property, where the only means of preventing the harm
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"would be refusing to rent the premises at all." Id. at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. The Court
found that although the harm was "undoubtedly great," the burden on the lessor of
preventing the harm outweighed any interest in imposing a duty to prevent it.
In this case, Plaintiff would move this Court to impose liability upon a lessor
when her lessee fails to maintain equipment the lessee is using with her own invitees, even
where the lessor retains no control over the lessee. Obviously, that is not the nature of a
lessor/lessee relationship, which ordinarily does not contemplate that the lessor will retain
control over her lessees' business practices.

In fact, to impose such a duty would

undermine the nature of the relationship between a lessor and her lessee, effectively
turning the lessor into a guarantor of her lessees' business practices.

That would

constitute an unfair burden to place upon a lessor/business owner, and would significantly
discourage business relationships of the kind here in issue. Accordingly, upon a "balancing
of the harm," there is no basis for imposing a duty upon Ms. Peabody to clean equipment
used by her tenants for their own business purposes. That is particularly true in the case
of cosmetology shops, where the business practices of cosmeticians like Ms. Cook are
effectively guaranteed by the Bureau of Occupational licenses, which has licensing
requirements, conducts inspections as it sees necessary, issues inspection reports based
on those inspections, and is empowered to discipline licensees if necessary.
3.

The District Court's Decision Should Be Upheld On Grounds That
Plaintiff Failed To Put Forth Admissible Evidence of Causation.

In responding to a motion for summary judgment, a party may not rely on
mere speculation to create a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Hollinsworth,
M.D., 136 Idaho 800, 802, 41 P.3d 228, 230 (2001). Rather, the non-moving party must
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put forth admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely. Bromleyv. Garey,
132 Idaho 807,979 P.2d 1165 (1999). "[T]rial courts must determine the admissibility of
evidence as a 'threshold question' to be answered before addressing the merits of motions
for summary judgment." Montgomeryv. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1,6,205 P.3d 650, 655
(2009). The court acts as gatekeeper to determine whether expert testimony is admissible.

Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756,760,215 P.3rd 476, 480 (2009); Montgomeryv.
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1,6,205 P.3rd 650, 655 (2009); Carnell v. Barker, 137 Idaho
322, 48 P.3rd 651 (2002). Expert testimony regarding causation may be excluded if it is
"based solely upon the temporal relationship between" two events. Swallow v. Emerg.

Med. Of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). A plaintiff's failure to put forth evidence
of causation may be fatal to her cause of action. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 396,
64 P.3d 317,322 (2003). The decision of a trial court, if it reaches the right result, will be
upheld upon the correct theory. Grabicki ex reI Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 154
Idaho 686,302 P.3d 26 (2013); Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984).
As discussed above, the district court was correct in granting summary
judgment in favor of Ms. Peabody, and in denying Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration.
Although the district court did not consider the duty issues discussed herein, it correctly
held that Plaintiff failed to produce evidence of causation to support her negligence claim.
Even on appeal, Plaintiff concedes that "[t]he only facts in the record regarding causation
are the opinions of Dr. Chandler." Appellant's Brief p. 8-9. Yet, the Chandler materials are
conclusory, speculative, and not based on personal knowledge of the affiant. Therefore,
those materials are inadmissible as evidence in opposition to summary judgment, and (as
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Plaintiff admits) without those materials there is absolutely no evidence to support
Plaintiff's causation theory. Accordingly, the district court's decision should be affirmed.
Plaintiff argued in her response to Ms. Peabody's second motion for
summary judgment that her own claim against Ms. Peabody "mirrors the DeTraz case in
many respects other than the event that created the opening for the bacteria occurred at
Defendants' establishment." (R. p. 285). Plaintiffs reliance upon the DeTraz v. Lee case
specifically raised the question of what "event ... created the opening."

Dr. Chandler

referred to that "event" as an "incident at the nail salon." (R. p. 2691f 2). Therefore, in Ms.
Peabody's reply to Plaintiff's argument, she properly questioned whether Dr. Chandler's
opinion regarding an "incident" possibly could be read as evidence of causation relating to
anything Ms. Peabody did, because Ms. Peabody had no involvement with the "incident
at the nail salon." Ms. Peabody further pointed out that even if Dr. Chandler's opinions
possibly could be read as referring to the condition of the foot basin, he had provided no
basis for rendering an opinion regarding the condition of the foot basin. The district court
agreed, granting summary judgment to Ms. Peabody.
Plaintiff submitted the Second Chandler Affidavit in support of her motion for
reconsideration, which purported to "clarify[] and explain[] his use of the words 'the incident'
in his opinions." (R. p. 347).9 Rather than "clarifying and explaining" his previous opinion,
the new affidavit discounted entirely "a poke, a prick, or a movement of the cuticle" as

9 Plaintiff has seemingly failed to appeal the district court's denial of her Motion to Reconsider,
and has sought review only of the court's summary judgment decision. Therefore, because the Second
Chandler Affidavit was submitted only with the Motion to Reconsider, and was not considered during the
summary judgment proceedings, it should not be considered by the Court on appeal from summary
judgment. However, Ms. Peabody will address the Second Chandler Affidavit's deficiencies here without
conceding that it should be considered on this appeal.
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contributing to the injury, and focused entirely on the condition of the foot basin.10
However, Dr. Chandler still did not explain how he possibly would have any knowledge of
the condition of the foot basin, and there is nothing in the record from which it reasonably
could be inferred that he had any such knowledge; in fact, it is clear that he did not.
In his Second Affidavit, Dr. Chandler testified that the opinions contained in
the Chandler Report were rendered in response to a letter from Plaintiffs counsel. (R. p.
3431(5). Plaintiff's counsel confirmed that, and supplied the court with a copy of the letter.
(R. p. 348; R. p. 340-41). In comparing the letter to Dr. Chandler from Plaintiffs counsel
with the Chandler Report, it is apparent that Dr. Chandler copied the questions submitted
by counsel, and placed his answer to each question immediately beneath that question.
Of particular importance to the issue at hand are questions 2 and 10, and Dr. Chandler's
answers thereto:

2.

Is there a causal relationship between the injuries or
conditions set forth in your answer above and the
incident of April 19, 2010, incident involving Tracy
Sales, Stacie Peabody dba Finger Prints Day Spa, and
Linda Cook? If so, upon what do you base your
opinion?
I do believe there is a causal relationship between the
injuries Ms. Sales sustained and the treatment she
received as a result to [sic] the incident at the nail salon
in April 2010. She never had any joint inflamation or
lesions anywhere on her body up to this point. and after
the incident that occurred on April 2010 is when she
began to experience these problems.

10 It is notable that any poke, prick, or movement of the cuticle would have occurred at the hands
of Linda Cook (that is undisputed), and that the parties had filed a Stipulation to Dismiss Linda Cook the
day before Plaintiff submitted her motion for reconsideration and Second Chandler Affidavit.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -34

10.

What documentation and [sic] have you reviewed in
formulating your opinions and responses to the above
questions?
In addition to copies of the bone scan, MRI, x-rays,
pertinent medical records and billing were all reviewed.

(R. p. 269-70) (emphasis added).
One thing is immediately clear from Dr. Chandler's response to question
number two: by his own sworn admission, Dr. Chandler's only basis for his opinions is that
Plaintiff's medical problems, per her subjective narrative, began sometime after April
2010. 11 In other words, as Ms. Peabody previously pointed out, Dr. Chandler's opinions
are based on a post hoc, ergo propter hoc analysis. (R. p. 300-301). Of course, as the
saying goes, "correlation does not imply causation." Dr. Chandler's opinions based solely
on the correlation of two events do not constitute admissible evidence of causation. See
Swallow v. Emerg. Med. Of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003) (upholding the trial
court's decision to exclude evidence of causation "based solely upon the temporal
relationship between" two events).
What is critically absent from Dr. Chandler's answers to questions 2 and 10
is any mention of anything at all about the condition of the foot basin. Once again, in
reviewing his report, it appears that Dr. Chandler relied entirely on Plaintiff's subjective
narrative in forming his opinions--but Plaintiff has no idea of the condition of the foot basin.

11 Plaintiffs narrative is contradicted by the medical records, which indicate she had a past
medical history of "psoriasis" (R. p. 156), "skin cancer, Cold Sores or Fever Blisters, skin disease" (R. p.
162), "a history of psoriasis for about 21 years" (R. p. 162), and had been experiencing problems with her
toe-the very toe at issue-for approximately a year and a half at the time she saw Dr. Chandler. (R. p.
158).
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In fact, Plaintiff testified that she "ha[s] no idea of knowing whether [Ms. Cook sterilized her
utensils or the foot basin prior to the pedicure]." (R. p. 20768:3-11). Therefore, he could
not have relied on anything Plaintiff said to acquire personal knowledge regarding the foot
basin.
There is no evidence that Dr. Chandler reviewed the results of any testing of
the foot basin. In fact, there is no evidence the foot basin ever was inspected or tested by
anyone other than the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, which always issued an "A" rating
to Fingerprints Nail Spa. Thus, even if Dr. Chandler had reviewed the results of the only
testing ever conducted, those results would not support a conclusion that the foot basin
was unclean.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence in the record that
Dr. Chandler spoke to Mr. Schoon or reviewed the Schoon Report in formulating his
opinions. If the Schoon Report were admissible, it would constitute the only evidence in
the record that the foot basin might have been improperly sanitized. 12 Therefore, the
Schoon Report is the only thing on which Dr. Chandler possibly could have relied to link
the condition of the foot basin to Plaintiff's medical condition. Dr. Chandler states in his
answer to question number ten, quoted above, that the only documents he relied on were
medical records and billing. Accordingly, Dr. Chandler's opinions are the product of pure

12 Mr. Schoon's report does not establish that the foot basin actually was unclean at the time of
the subject pedicure. At most, his opinion established that the foot basin may have been cleaned with
disregard to the instructions for use on the label of Ms. Peabody's sanitizer. That is, although Mr. Schoon
opines that "Stacy Peabody did not properly clean and disinfect her pedicure tub unit" (R. p. 256), Ms.
Cook has testified via affidavit that she, too, cleaned the pedicure tub she used with her clients. (R. p. 273
11 6). Mr. Schoon has rendered no opinion regarding whether Ms. Cook properly cleaned and disinfected
the pedicure tub. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the pedicure tub actually was unclean
when Ms. Cook used it to perform the subject pedicure. In fact, the only evidence in the record regarding
the condition of the pedicure tub at the time in question is Ms. Cook's testimony: to wit, that she cleaned it.
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speculation and are not admissible as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment. See Reedv. Foster, 130 Idaho 74,78,936 P.2d 1316,1320 (1997) (upholding
the trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony where the expert "lacked critical
information necessary to provide a sufficient foundation for his opinion.").
The United States District Court for the District of Washington recently dealt
with a similar case where the plaintiff argued in opposition to summary judgment that "[t]he
only evidence before the court on causation of [Plaintiff's] injuries is the evidence of her
treating doctors that the pedicure was the cause of her infected toe." Pepper v. JC Penny
Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88494, *11, 2008 WL 4614268 (W.D. Wash. 2008)

(alteration in original).

However, the evidence in the record demonstrated that the

physicians had based their causation opinion on the plaintiffs self-report, and the medical
records conflicted with the self-report, indicating that the plaintiff had chipped the affected
toenail weeks prior to the subject pedicure. The court stated:
[T]o survive summary judgment, the plaintiff's showing of
proximate cause must be based on more than conjecture or
speculation. The cause of an accident may be said to be
speculative when, from a consideration of all the facts, it is as
likely that it happened from one cause as another. In other
words, if here is nothing more tangible to proceed upon than
two or more conjectural theories under one or more of which
a defendant would be liable and under one or more of which a
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, a jury will not be
permitted to conjecture how the accident occurred.
Id. at *9-10. The court found, from all the evidence in the record, there were "at least two

potential causes in fact resulting in the infection, only one of which could result in
Defendant's liability." Id. at *12. Accordingly, the plaintiff had not established that it was
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more likely than not that the pedicure caused her infection, and the court dismissed the
case on summary judgment rather than turn it over to a jury to decide by conjecture.
Likewise, in this case, Dr. Chandler has based his causation opinion solely
on Plaintiff's self-report, but the medical records conflict with her self-report, and indicate
there are at least two potential causes in fact contributing to Plaintiff's toe problems, at
least one of which would not entitle Plaintiff to any recovery from Ms. Peabody. The
medical records indicate that: (1) Plaintiff had a past medical history of "psoriasis" and "skin
disease." (R. p. 156; R. p. 162); (2) Plaintiff reported noticing thickening and separation of
the nail from the foot "[f]or the past 16 months," i.e. since almost a year before the pedicure
procedure. (R. p. 158); and, (3) Plaintiff reported that she "did injure the toes and dropped
a book on them sometime ago." Id.
First, several of Plaintiffs medical providers, including Dr. Chandler, related
Plaintiffs condition to her past history of psoriasis. (R. p. 149 ("Because of the psoriatic
arthritis and acute inflamation it appears that she may have damaged the nail matrix and
will have a deformed naiL"); R. p. 161 ("IMPRESSION: Question osteomyelitis versus
psoriatic disease versus I guess a remote possibility would be inflammatory bowel disease
related arthritis. I tend to actually favor psoriatic disease at this juncture."); R. p. 268 ("We
suspected because she has a history of psoriasis that this is probably a psoriatic arthritic
joint."); R. p. 190 101:5 to 108:25). Of course, Ms. Peabody would have no liability for
damages caused by Plaintiff's psoriasis.
Second, when Plaintiff first presented to any medical provider with concerns
about her toe, more than five months after the pedicure, it appears she did not mention the
pedicure at all. (R. p. 158-59).
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Plaintiff did, however, indicate that she had been

experiencing the problems with her toe "[f]or the past 16 months." (R. p. 158). She also
indicated that "[s]he did injure the toes and dropped a book on them sometime ago." Id.
Again, Ms. Peabody would have no liability for an injury commencing almost a year prior
to the subject pedicure, nor for an injury due to Plaintiff dropping a book on her own toes.
As in the Pepper v. JC Penny Corp. case, it is a matter of pure conjecture
as to what the problem is with Plaintiff's toe-much less what the source of that problem
might be. Dr. Chandler has based his causation opinion solely on Plaintiffs self-report, but
her self-report is contradicted by the medical records, which reveal multiple potential
sources of Plaintiff's medical problems. Therefore, the cause of Plaintiffs condition is
speculative, because "from a consideration of all the facts, it is as likely that it happened
from one cause as another." Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed rather than
turned over to a jury to decide by conjecture. Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361,716 P.2d 505

(1986); see a/so Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647,658-59,448 P.2d 653, 664-65 (1968)
(discussing the Court's "duty to exercise surveillance over the jury to prevent the rendition
of verdicts not based upon sufficient evidence.").

II
II
II
II
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Ms. Peabody respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in her favor, and denial of
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider.
DATED this )%?day of February, 2014.
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